Crises
Weimar hyperinflation (1914 to 1924), 1914 to 1924 (hyperinflation 1923)
A war financed by debt, reparations, the Ruhr occupation and a central bank that printed to cover the deficit took the mark from 4.2 per dollar in 1914 to 4.2 trillion in November 1923, with prices doubling every 3.7 days at the peak. Savers and bondholders were wiped out; owners of real assets and debtors gained. The Rentenmark ended it in one month once the fiscal cause was addressed.
The fall in numbers
- Years
- 1914 to 1924 (hyperinflation 1923)
- Index
- German stocks in gold terms
- Peak
- Jun 1922
- Trough
- Nov 1923
- Peak to trough
- -90.0%
- Time from peak to trough
- 24 months
- Recession
- No
- Regions
- Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland
- Markets
- Fx, Rates, Real assets
In one line
When the state prints to pay its bills, every saver in the currency pays.
What happened
A war financed by debt, reparations, the Ruhr occupation and a central bank that printed to cover the deficit took the mark from 4.2 per dollar in 1914 to 4.2 trillion in November 1923, with prices doubling every 3.7 days at the peak. Savers and bondholders were wiped out; owners of real assets and debtors gained. The Rentenmark ended it in one month once the fiscal cause was addressed.
How it unfolded
Fiscal dominance (1919-01 to 1922-05, 41 months)
Deficits covered by the Reichsbank, reparations payable in gold and goods, inflation of 50 to 100% a year that most Germans still treated as temporary. Stocks rose in nominal terms but fell in gold terms.
What came next: From mid-1922 the public lost faith in the mark; velocity rose and the exchange rate fell faster than the money supply grew.
Hyperinflation (1922-06 to 1923-11, 18 months)
The mark went from 300 per dollar to 4.2 trillion; wages were paid twice a day; real-asset owners and debtors gained, savers and pensioners lost everything.
What came next: Stabilisation came within weeks of the Rentenmark and a balanced budget; the political damage lasted a generation.
Stabilisation (1923-12 to 1925-12, 25 months)
A new currency backed by a claim on land and industry, a balanced budget, foreign loans under the Dawes Plan, and a stabilisation recession.
What came next: The 'golden twenties' on borrowed US money, then 1929 and deflation under the gold-exchange standard.
Key dates
| Date | Event | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| 1914-08 | Gold convertibility suspended; war financed by debt | Build-up begins |
| 1921-05 | Reparations bill fixed at 132 billion gold marks | Warning |
| 1922-06 | Rathenau assassinated; the mark's fall accelerates | Trigger |
| 1923-01-11 | French occupation of the Ruhr; passive resistance paid by printing | Panic |
| 1923-10 | Peak inflation about 29,500% a month | Panic |
| 1923-11-15 | Rentenmark introduced; 1 trillion marks = 1 Rentenmark | Policy turn |
| 1924-08 | Reichsmark; Dawes Plan | Old high regained |
By the numbers
- German stocks in gold terms: -90% from the peak to the low
- Peak to low: 24 months
- USD/mark: -99.99%
What moved
- Fell: all mark-denominated bonds and savings: total loss (1923)
- Fell: German stocks fell about 90% in gold terms despite rising nominal prices (1918 to 1923)
- Held up or rose: real assets, foreign currency, gold, debtors (mortgages repaid in worthless marks) (1922 to 1923)
- Held up or rose: US dollar against the mark: infinite in practice (1919 to 1923)
Lessons the episode left
- Inflation becomes hyperinflation when the public stops believing the currency will be defended.
- Nominal stock gains hid a 90% loss in real terms.
- The end required fixing the fiscal cause; the new currency alone would not have held.
What this means for a reader
Signs that were visible at the time:
- Exchange rate falling faster than money supply grows
- Nominal prices rising for everything while real wealth is destroyed
A common misreading: Expecting hyperinflation whenever a central bank expands its balance sheet; it needs fiscal dominance and a loss of confidence.
History gives the range of what has happened, not what happens next. The numbers above are one index at one place; other markets in the same episode moved differently.
Sources
- Cagan (1956)
- Holtfrerich (1986)
- Feldman (1993)
- FinUties crisis case file 05-weimar-hyperinflation-1923.md