Crises
The Asian financial crisis (1997 to 1998)
The Asian miracle economies had grown 7 to 9% a year, pegged to the dollar and borrowed heavily in dollars at short maturities, much of it into property through weak banks. When the dollar rose and exports slowed, a speculative attack broke the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 and the panic travelled through Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. Currencies lost 40 to 80% of their dollar value, GDP fell 5 to 13% in a year, and IMF programmes of about $120 billion followed.
The fall in numbers
- Years
- 1997 to 1998
- Index
- Hang Seng (-61%), Thai SET (-75%)
- Peak
- Jul 1997
- Trough
- Jan 1998
- Peak to trough
- -61.0%
- Time from peak to trough
- 12 months
- Recession
- Yes
- Regions
- Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong
- Markets
- Fx em, Equity index, Banks
In one line
The miracle economies ran out of dollars.
What happened
The Asian miracle economies had grown 7 to 9% a year, pegged to the dollar and borrowed heavily in dollars at short maturities, much of it into property through weak banks. When the dollar rose and exports slowed, a speculative attack broke the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 and the panic travelled through Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. Currencies lost 40 to 80% of their dollar value, GDP fell 5 to 13% in a year, and IMF programmes of about $120 billion followed. The region recovered fast and then built the reserves that fed the 2000s savings glut.
How it unfolded
Dollar pegs and dollar debt (1995-06 to 1997-05, 24 months)
Short-term foreign borrowing into property and overbuilt industry, current-account deficits of 5 to 8% of GDP, pegs that became overvalued as the dollar rose and the yen fell; stock markets had already peaked in 1996.
What came next: A speculative attack exhausted Thai reserves; the float on 2 July 1997 set off contagion through the region within six weeks.
Contagion (1997-07 to 1998-01, 7 months)
Baht -55%, won -53%, ringgit -47%, rupiah -85%; banks and conglomerates with dollar debt failed; IMF programmes of $17, $43 and $57 billion came with controversial austerity; the Hong Kong peg held at the cost of a 61% equity fall.
What came next: GDP collapses in 1998 (Indonesia -13%), political change in Indonesia, then V-shaped recoveries from 1999 on exports and cheap currencies; the shock moved on to Russia and LTCM.
Output collapse (1998-02 to 1998-09, 8 months)
Real GDP fell 5 to 13% in 1998, unemployment and poverty surged, bank recapitalisation cost 30 to 57% of GDP; Malaysia imposed capital controls in September 1998.
What came next: Recovery began in 1999 with current-account surpluses; Asia built $3 trillion of reserves, a cause of low global yields in the 2000s.
Export-led rebound (1998-10 to 2000-03, 18 months)
Cheap currencies and global demand; Korean stocks tripled from the low.
What came next: Reserve accumulation and the global savings glut that fed the US housing boom.
Key dates
| Date | Event | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| 1995-04 | Dollar bottoms; Asian pegs start to lose competitiveness | Build-up begins |
| 1997-02 | Finance One (Thailand) fails; baht attacked | Warning |
| 1997-07-02 | Thai baht floated | Trigger |
| 1997-08-14 | Indonesia floats the rupiah | Panic |
| 1997-10-23 | Hong Kong rate spike; Hang Seng -10% | Panic |
| 1997-10-27 | DJIA -7.2% | Panic |
| 1997-12-23 | Korean won low 1,960 | Panic |
| 1998-01 | Rupiah low about 16,000 (-85%) | Low |
| 1998-05-21 | Suharto resigns | Panic |
| 1998-09-01 | Malaysian capital controls | Policy turn |
| 1999 | Korea and Thailand grow again | Old high regained |
By the numbers
- Hang Seng (-61%), Thai SET (-75%): -61% from the peak to the low
- Peak to low: 12 months
- Output, peak to trough: -13%
- USD/IDR (baht -55%, won -53%): -85%
What moved
- Fell: rupiah -85%, baht -55%, won -53%, ringgit -47% (1997-07 to 1998-01)
- Fell: Hang Seng -61%, SET -75%, regional indices -60 to -80% in dollars (1997 to 1998)
- Fell: Brent to $10 by December 1998 (1997 to 1998)
- Held up or rose: US dollar; yen after the 1998 unwind (1997 to 1998)
- Held up or rose: Treasuries rallied as capital fled to the US (1997 to 1998)
Lessons the episode left
- Short-term dollar debt plus a peg plus weak banks: the twin-crisis recipe.
- Contagion runs through common creditors and similar structures, not through trade alone.
- Austerity in a balance-sheet crisis deepened the output collapse.
- Recovery was fast where currencies were allowed to fall and exports could respond.
- The crisis exported itself: commodity prices fell and the shock reached Russia and Wall Street a year later.
What this means for a reader
Signs that were visible at the time:
- A rising dollar against currencies pegged to it
- Reserves shrinking while short-term foreign debt grows
A common misreading: Dismissing it as an emerging-market story; it set off 1998 and shaped global rates for a decade.
History gives the range of what has happened, not what happens next. The numbers above are one index at one place; other markets in the same episode moved differently.
Sources
- Radelet and Sachs (1998)
- Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini (1999)
- Laeven and Valencia (2012)
- Fed H.10 (open)
- FinUties crisis case file 14-asian-financial-crisis-1997.md