Crises
The ERM crisis and Black Wednesday (1992), 1990 to 1993
Germany fought reunification inflation with high rates; Britain, Italy, Spain and the Nordics had pegged to the mark and could not follow without deeper recessions. Speculators bet the pegs would break and on 16 September 1992 Britain and Italy left the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Sterling fell about 15%, the Treasury lost about £3.3 billion, and Britain then grew for 15 years outside the system. The lessons shaped the euro.
The fall in numbers
- Years
- 1990 to 1993
- Index
- FTSE 100 (rose after the exit)
- Peak
- Jun 1992
- Trough
- Nov 1992
- Peak to trough
- -15.0%
- Time from peak to trough
- 4.0 months
- Recession
- Yes
- Regions
- UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Finland, France
- Markets
- Fx, Rates, Equity index
In one line
A currency peg that broke because the anchor country needed the opposite policy.
What happened
Germany fought reunification inflation with high rates; Britain, Italy, Spain and the Nordics had pegged to the mark and could not follow without deeper recessions. Speculators bet the pegs would break and on 16 September 1992 Britain and Italy left the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Sterling fell about 15%, the Treasury lost about £3.3 billion, and Britain then grew for 15 years outside the system. The lessons shaped the euro.
How it unfolded
Pegs under a tightening anchor (1991-06 to 1992-05, 12 months)
German rates at 8 to 9% to cool reunification; UK in recession with inflation falling and the pound at the bottom of its band; Italian deficits; the Nordics defending pegs with rate hikes.
What came next: The Danish referendum in June 1992 raised doubts about the union; capital fled the weak currencies and reserves ran down through the summer.
Speculative attack (1992-06 to 1992-11, 6 months)
Finland, Italy, Britain, Spain, Sweden and Norway devalued or floated in turn; the Bank of England raised rates twice in a day and spent much of its reserves before leaving at 7.30 pm.
What came next: Devaluation plus lower rates produced growth, not inflation; British unemployment fell from 1993 and the inflation-target regime began.
Growth outside the peg (1992-12 to 1994-12, 25 months)
Lower rates and a cheaper currency; a 15-year expansion in Britain.
What came next: The second wave in 1993 widened the bands; the euro was designed to make exits impossible, which set up 2010.
Key dates
| Date | Event | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| 1990-10-08 | UK joins the ERM at DM2.95 | Build-up begins |
| 1991-12 | Bundesbank raises rates after reunification | Warning |
| 1992-06-02 | Danish No to Maastricht | Trigger |
| 1992-09-08 | Finland floats the markka | Panic |
| 1992-09-13 | Lira devalued | Panic |
| 1992-09-16 | Black Wednesday: UK rates to 15%, sterling leaves | Panic |
| 1992-11-19 | Sweden floats after a 500% marginal rate | Panic |
| 1993-08-02 | ERM bands widened to 15% | Policy turn |
| 1993 | UK recovery begins | Old high regained |
By the numbers
- FTSE 100 (rose after the exit): -15% from the peak to the low
- Peak to low: 4 months
- GBP/DEM: -15%
What moved
- Fell: sterling -15%, lira -20%, peseta -19% in stages (1992-09 to 1993-05)
- Fell: central-bank reserves (UK, Italy, Spain, France) (1992)
- Fell: holders of weak-currency bonds hedged into marks (1992)
- Held up or rose: short sterling and lira; the mark (1992-09)
- Held up or rose: UK stocks rallied after the exit as rates fell (1992-10 to 1993)
Lessons the episode left
- A peg between economies that need different policy is a one-way bet once the market doubts it.
- Reserves and rate hikes buy days, not months.
- Leaving the peg was the start of the recovery, not a disaster.
- Second-generation crises are self-fulfilling: the attack itself makes the peg unsustainable.
What this means for a reader
Signs that were visible at the time:
- Anchor-country rate hikes while the pegged economy is in recession
- A political shock to the credibility of the arrangement
A common misreading: Expecting devaluation to bring inflation and crisis; for Britain it brought 15 years of growth.
History gives the range of what has happened, not what happens next. The numbers above are one index at one place; other markets in the same episode moved differently.
Sources
- Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993)
- HM Treasury FOI release (2005)
- Obstfeld (1996)
- FinUties crisis case file 12-erm-crisis-black-wednesday-1992.md