Crises
US savings and loans and the Nordic banking crises (1980 to 1995)
Two versions of one story. US savings and loans, insolvent after the 1980 rate shock, were deregulated and allowed to gamble on commercial property; 1,043 thrifts failed and the clean-up cost taxpayers about $124 billion. In Sweden, Finland and Norway deregulation, a currency peg and a property boom ended in the deepest post-war banking crises of any rich country; Finland's GDP fell 10% and unemployment reached 18%.
The fall in numbers
- Years
- 1980 to 1995
- Index
- Swedish and Finnish indices (Helsinki about -70%)
- Peak
- Jan 1990
- Trough
- Dec 1992
- Peak to trough
- -70.0%
- Time from peak to trough
- 30 months
- Recession
- Yes
- Regions
- US, Sweden, Finland, Norway
- Markets
- Banks, Property, Fx
In one line
Deregulated lenders, borrowed property prices, and the textbook clean-up.
What happened
Two versions of one story. US savings and loans, insolvent after the 1980 rate shock, were deregulated and allowed to gamble on commercial property; 1,043 thrifts failed and the clean-up cost taxpayers about $124 billion. In Sweden, Finland and Norway deregulation, a currency peg and a property boom ended in the deepest post-war banking crises of any rich country; Finland's GDP fell 10% and unemployment reached 18%. Sweden's response (guarantee everything, take over the banks, separate the bad assets) became the textbook model.
How it unfolded
Credit and property boom (1985-01 to 1989-12, 60 months)
Deregulated lenders financed commercial and residential property at rising prices; Nordic private credit grew 20 to 30% a year under a currency peg; US thrifts chased yield in junk bonds and Texas real estate.
What came next: Property prices turned in 1989 to 1990 as rates rose; loan losses surfaced within a year and whole banking systems needed state support.
Loan losses and bank failures (1990-01 to 1992-12, 36 months)
US: 1,043 thrifts and 1,600 banks failed; the RTC sold $400 billion of assets. Nordics: Finland GDP -10%, unemployment to 18%, bank support of 6 to 13% of GDP, pegs broken in 1991 to 1992.
What came next: Fiscal costs were recovered partly by selling the bad banks' assets; recoveries began in 1993 and were export-led after the devaluations.
Resolution (1993-01 to 1995-12, 36 months)
Blanket guarantee, nationalisation, bad-asset separation, then privatisation; the US introduced prompt corrective action.
What came next: Sweden ran a budget surplus by the late 1990s; the model was reused in 2008 by the UK and US.
Key dates
| Date | Event | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| 1980-03 | US deposit-rate deregulation; S&Ls insolvent on rising rates | Build-up begins |
| 1985 | Nordic credit deregulation | Build-up begins |
| 1986 | FSLIC insolvent; Texas property collapses with oil | Warning |
| 1989-08-09 | FIRREA; Resolution Trust Corporation | Policy turn |
| 1990 | Nordic property prices turn; Norwegian banks fail | Trigger |
| 1991-09 | Finnish markka devalued; Swedish banks report losses | Panic |
| 1992-09-24 | Swedish blanket guarantee | Policy turn |
| 1992-11-19 | Krona floated | Panic |
| 1993 | Nordic recovery begins | Old high regained |
| 1995 | RTC closes | Aftermath |
By the numbers
- Swedish and Finnish indices (Helsinki about -70%): -70% from the peak to the low
- Peak to low: 30 months
- Output, peak to trough: -10%
- Unemployment at its worst: 18%
- SEK, FIM versus DEM: -25%
What moved
- Fell: Nordic commercial property -50 to -70%; Texas property collapse (1990 to 1993)
- Fell: most Nordic banks nationalised or recapitalised; 1,043 US thrifts (1990 to 1993)
- Fell: krona and markka -20 to -30% after the pegs broke (1991 to 1992)
- Held up or rose: buyers of RTC and Securum assets at distressed prices (1991 to 1995)
- Held up or rose: Nordic exporters after the devaluations (1993 onward)
Lessons the episode left
- Credit growth after deregulation is the leading indicator; property prices are the lagging one.
- A currency peg turns a domestic credit bust into a currency crisis.
- Fast, full and transparent resolution (Sweden) cost less than forbearance (US thrifts, Japan).
- Rate mismatch (long fixed assets, short deposits) made the thrifts insolvent before the gambling started.
What this means for a reader
Signs that were visible at the time:
- Private credit growing far faster than income
- Lenders expanding into unfamiliar assets after deregulation
A common misreading: Treating a banking crisis as sudden; the losses were years old before they were admitted.
History gives the range of what has happened, not what happens next. The numbers above are one index at one place; other markets in the same episode moved differently.
Sources
- Curry and Shibut (FDIC 2000)
- Englund (1999)
- Jonung, Kiander, Vartia (2009)
- FinUties crisis case file 09-us-savings-and-loan-and-nordic-banking-1980s-90s.md